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Conference Opening Remarks 
 
In my remarks today I would like to argue that there is value in codifying criminal law in 
a way that incorporates the principles of Shari’a, to the extent that the members of the society 
have internalized those principles. In an increasingly complex and legalistic modern world, the 
codification of the Shari’a principles touching criminal law may be the best way of assuring that 
those principles are carried forward.  
 There are good reasons for the present strong trend toward codifying a comprehensive 
statement of the elements of all offenses, defenses, and liability rules. First, codification 
provides fair notice of the criminal law’s rules to the people who are bound by them. Second, 
codification increases uniformity in application, so similar cases are treated similarly. It is hardly 
justice when similar cases are treated differently simply because they are decided by different 
judges. Third, codification provides a platform for refinement and improvement of the criminal 
law in the future. It is difficult to have public discussion and debate if the rules and their 
application are unclear or subject to differing interpretations. Only a clear, unambiguous 
codified text can provide the clarity needed. Finally, codification of the criminal rules makes 
clear that the power to revise the rules is clearly within the hands of the national government 
rather than in the hands of an individual judge. 
These virtues probably explain why the past several centuries have seen a persistent 
march toward greater and more comprehensive criminal law codification. The shift between 
uncodified or partially codified law and comprehensive codification moves in only one 
direction. There are almost no instances of a country, having shifted to a comprehensive 
criminal law codification, abandoning it to return to a system of uncodified or partially codified 
criminal law. 
 I have worked on criminal law codification projects in a number of countries, including 
two developing Muslim countries. I have also directed criminal law codification projects for 
states and the federal government in the United States. So I am sensitive to the challenge of 
codification both from the academic and the practical point of view. 
For many developing countries, the task of codifying their criminal law can be a 
challenging project and we are lucky that there are international organizations willing to assist 
developing countries to undertake such ambitious projects by providing both funding and 
expertise. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the International 
Development Law Organization (IDLO) are just two of such organizations, and they have done a 
fine job helping developing countries with criminal law codification projects around the globe. 
 As useful as these international organizations are, however, there is also a natural 
tension between the internationals and the locals. It is natural for the internationals to want to 
promote adoption of international norms in the new criminal codes. But I have reservations 
about the wisdom of their pressing for the incorporation of these norms if they conflicted with 
local community views. I think all parties, both the internationals and the locals, are better off if 
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a criminal code is based upon the shared judgments of justice of the ordinary people within the 
society, rather than based upon international or Western norms. Here’s why. 
 One could certainly make some democratic arguments in favor of having criminal law 
enshrine the community’s judgments of justice. Criminal law protects us from the most 
egregious harms and we allow it to impose the most serious sanctions. So it is particularly 
appropriate in a democracy that the members of the society decide what constitutes a crime 
and how much punishment will be imposed.  
 But that is a political and philosophical argument. I want to argue that having criminal 
law track ordinary people’s judgments of justice has great practical value as well. Modern 
empirical studies by social scientists have shown that a criminal law that tracks the 
community’s judgments of justice can build a reputation with the community as being a moral 
authority to which they should defer and acquiesce. A criminal justice system that can earn 
such “moral credibility” with the community can increase its power to gain compliance and, 
particularly importantly, to cause people to internalize the criminal law’s norms. In other 
words, a criminal law that earns a reputation for being just can harness the powerful forces of 
social influence and internalized norms in order to benefit society by better controlling crime 
and by strengthening societal norms. In contrast, the empirical studies suggest that a criminal 
law that regularly conflicts with ordinary people’s judgments of justice can lose moral 
credibility, inspire resistance and subversion, and undermine the system’s crime-control 
effectiveness and socialization power. 
 This relationship between tracking community views and the criminal code’s 
effectiveness is both sensitive and continuous. It is sensitive in the sense that we know from 
empirical research that every incremental reduction in moral credibility produces an 
incremental loss in the criminal law’s ability to control crime and internalize norms. The 
relationship is continuous in the sense that it does not matter how good or how bad your 
current criminal justice system is at the moment. Whatever its current state, improving its 
moral credibility with the community will incrementally increase its effectiveness, and reducing 
its moral credibility with the community will incrementally decrease its effectiveness. 
 Thus, the message to the internationals who sponsor criminal law codification projects 
is that they ought not insist upon a criminal code that tracks international norms but rather one 
that tracks local norms. If they force upon the locals a criminal code of international norms that 
conflict with local norms, it will simply serve to undermine the code’s legitimacy and moral 
credibility, which will undermine the value of the entire project. They can advance their own 
agenda better in the long term if they help establish an effective criminal code, which might 
then be a vehicle for future shifts of community views toward international norms. 
 The internationals can of course provide arguments to the locals for why the 
international norms ought to be adopted. And if at some point local norms shift to better align 
with international norms, then the criminal code ought to be amended accordingly. But 
demanding that the code adopt rules that conflict with local norms is a losing strategy from the 
beginning because it will tend to discredit the entire project in the eyes of the local community. 
 It should be pointed out that the same arguments for having criminal law track 
community views apply equally to the political elites in the country. They are likely to be in 
control of the criminal law codification process and no doubt would be tempted to draft the 
code to reflect their own views without regard to the views of the larger community. Such an 
approach may promote their political agenda but, to the extent that it conflicts with existing 
community views, it will damage the code’s reputation and ultimately its effectiveness. 
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 I have little doubt that some political elites or religious leaders will want to push back 
against this point. The clerics might understandably argue that “the criminal law must reflect 
God’s rules, whether the people have internalized those rules are not.” The strength of this 
claim is undeniable. However, what the clerics must understand is that there is a hidden cost to 
insisting upon a criminal law rule that the community sees as unjust, for it undermines the 
criminal law’s moral credibility and longer-term can undermine the legitimacy and support for 
Shari’a. 
 There is one important exception to the rule that criminal codes ought to reflect 
community views. One can imagine a situation where political, social, and religious leaders 
want to change community norms on one issue or another. Can they use criminal law reform to 
help them do that?  
If the criminal code has in other respects tracked community views and has earned 
moral credibility with the community, social reformers can take the “moral credibility chips” 
that it has earned and “spend” them to help change community views. If citizens have come to 
see the criminal code as a reliable statement of what is and is not truly condemnable, then a 
criminal code change that criminalizes new conduct, for example, will be taken as a persuasive 
signal that this new conduct is indeed condemnable. 
If the attempt to shift community views is successful, then the law-community conflict 
will soon disappear and the law’s moral credibility will be maintained. However, if community 
views do not promptly show movement toward adopting the criminal law’s new rule, then the 
reformers ought to back off, return the law to match existing community views, and perhaps try 
to use other mechanisms, such as religious or educational institutions, to change community 
norms before they have criminal law criminalize the new conduct. 
 To return to the issue of the common points of tension between the international 
organizations and the local community, while this problem exists to some extent in most 
criminal law codification projects, it is a particular challenge in developing Muslim countries. 
Many Westerners assume that a criminal code based upon Shari’a would in all respects look like 
the severe penalties that they see in the hudud offenses. Thus, the internationals may well 
oppose any reliance upon Shari’a in drafting a criminal code. 
 But this concern comes from a misunderstanding of Shari’a and the hudud offenses. In 
my experience, the principles underlying the treatment of criminal law cases under Shari’a are 
very similar to the standard principles underlying criminal law around the world. I am certainly 
no Shari’a expert but it seems clear, for example, that Shari’a holds central a principle of 
proportionality between blameworthiness and punishment, as do most criminal law systems in 
the world. Indeed, even in the definition of what constitutes a crime and in the factors that 
distinguish more serious and less serious offenses, there is an enormous amount of overlap 
around the world. The differences that do exist tend to be those that relate to the relatively few 
number of culturally dependent offenses such as those relating to family and religion. But the 
vast majority of the criminal code provisions in a Shari’a-based criminal code would be entirely 
compatible with the provisions of a Western criminal code. But this enormous level of 
agreement is hidden by Westerners’ mistaken assumption that the hudud offenses reflect the 
typical principles of justice contained in Shari’a. 
 The hudud offenses do present a special challenge for codifying criminal law in a 
developing Muslim country. It is common for the local community to be devout and to want to 
honor their religion and the teachings of the Koran as they draft their criminal code. On the 
other hand, it is also common that many aspects of the hudud offenses conflict with the local 
community’s existing norms. What is to be done? 
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 In these situations, sometimes thoughtful analysis and creative drafting can help 
accommodate the points of tension. For example, if the local Muslim community does not in 
fact support use of the death penalty but, out of their devotion to Islam and the Koran, does 
not wish to formally abolish it, the criminal code can formally adopt the death penalty but, 
following Shari’a’s principle of proportionality in punishment, specifically provide that this 
uniquely harsh punishment must be reserved for the uniquely most egregious case. Thus, if one 
can imagine a case worse than the case at hand, then the death penalty ought not be imposed 
in the case at hand but rather reserved under the proportionality principle for use only in the 
most egregious case.  
Similarly, if the local community’s modern judgments of justice do not support lashes as 
a punishment, the criminal code can preserve that formal punishment but convert it into a 
formal occasion of symbolic public condemnation where ceremonial lashes cause no pain or 
injury. A similar symbolic approach might be taken with regard to other traditional penalties, 
such as cutting, stoning, or physical retaliation. 
 In other instances, however, existing community norms may conflict with the hudud 
offenses in a way that leaves little room for a creative accommodation. For example, some 
Muslim communities may reject the propriety of serious penalties for apostasy, criticizing Islam, 
failure to fast, adultery, or false claim of adultery, among others. But even here, it is possible to 
seriously limit the application of the offense by adding a series of restrictions on its scope or by 
creating special proof requirements that typically cannot be satisfied.  
I understand and to some extent support such attempts at accommodating the tension 
between the traditional offenses and the community’s modern sensibilities. However, it is 
worth noting that these kind of accommodations are less attractive than the two approaches at 
accommodation described previously. Those previously-described approaches are entirely 
principled, while these are less so.  
Given the proportionality principle, it really does make sense to limit the death penalty 
to the most egregious offense imaginable. And in the use of purely ceremonial lashing or other 
symbolic punishment, the law is being open and straightforward about what it seeks to do: the 
violation deserves public censure but not physical punishment.  
In contrast, the latter approach – setting unattainable proof requirements, for example 
– seems more like cynical manipulation. If the conduct is truly sufficiently condemnable to 
deserve criminal liability, then it deserves some punishment, even if the punishment is simply 
formal public condemnation. But criminalizing the conduct then making its prosecution 
impossible would seem to be gameplaying, which will tend to undermine the criminal code’s 
moral credibility. People may wonder: Is the conduct criminally condemnable or not? 
 To conclude my remarks, I very much understand the motivation of many groups to 
want to push hard for a new criminal code to reflect values important to them. The 
international organizations have a conception of human rights and freedoms that is dear to 
them. Political and religious authorities in a country want the criminal code to promote the 
values that they hold important. However, modern social science research has shown us the 
dangers and hidden costs of allowing these global or national political or religious preferences 
to shape a criminal code in ways that conflict with existing judgments of justice of the 
community to which it applies. In contrast, a criminal code that tracks community views can 
harness the powerful forces of social influence and internalized norms, and this power can be 
used to help shape community views in the future, to bring long-term change or to provide 
long-term stability. 
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Conference Closing Remarks 
 
 The perspective I am offering is different from most of what you have heard during this 
conference. Most other speakers are genuine Shari’a experts. I am giving the perspective of 
somebody who does a lot of criminal law reform in many different kinds of countries, cultures 
around the world. I am a student of Shari’a, not an expert on it. Yes, I directed two Shari’a-
based criminal code drafting projects, but it was not my Shari’a expertise that I was 
contributing but rather my criminal code drafting expertise. I can offer a scientific perspective 
on the issues because I do a lot of work with social psychologists. 
I do think that my perspective can be useful to the issues raised in this conference. I have two 
points to make in these closing remarks. One topic I talked about in my opening remarks; the 
other is new to the conference discussions. The first topic is about justice; the second is about 
fairness.  
 As to the first topic, you remember my discussion in my opening remarks about my 
friction with international organizations that have funded the criminal code reform projects in 
the developing Muslim countries. Some of the internationals wanted the criminal codes being 
drafted to incorporate international norms. And my advice to them was that it actually made 
more sense to not push that point. It was better to have those criminal codes incorporate local 
norms, which were typically Muslim norms. 
My reason for arguing that position was that we know from empirical research that a criminal 
code that conflicts with local norms is one that will provoke resistance and subversion. And 
there is the likelihood that those conflicts, and the resulting bad reputation that the criminal 
code gets, are likely to undermine its effective operation to gain compliance in the future. The 
conflicts with local community norms undermine the new code’s moral credibility and, as a 
result, the code loses the ability to get the citizens to internalize the norms expressed in the 
code. If people see the criminal code as setting rules that they believe are unjust, rules that, for 
example, criminalize conduct that in the community’s view is not truly condemnable, then they 
will never come to see the code as a reliable moral authority. Thus, when the code criminalizes 
certain conduct for which the condemnability is unclear, people are more likely to simply ignore 
the code, and assume that is one more example of the criminal code getting it wrong.  
 On the other hand, if the conflicts between local norms and the criminal code are 
minimized, the code can earn moral authority with the community, which can give it a 
potentially enormous power to gain deference and to influence the shaping of local norms. If 
the code tracks community views faithfully, it can earn a reputation for being a reliable 
statement of what is truly condemnable, and thereby can gain the power to persuade people 
that when it criminalizes something it really does mean that the criminalized conduct is truly 
condemnable. Thus, people are more likely to accept this assessment, to conform their conduct 
accordingly, and eventually to internalize the norm as their own.  
That internalization is enormously important. Having a norm internalized is much more 
powerful than having a policeman standing nearby who might (or might not) arrest the person. 
Once you internalize some value, that means that you will act upon that value because that's 
you. You do it for yourself, your own view of yourself. It doesn't matter whether there are other 
people around or not. That is the ultimate power of social influence; to be able to get people to 
internalize your norms. Where the criminal code conflicts with existing norms, it loses the 
ability to shape community norms in the future and to have people internalize its norms.  
 Does that dynamic, which I described in my opening remarks, have relevance in Iran? 
Over the course of the last two days I have had a significant education in Iranian criminal law 
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and how it operates. Many speakers have talked about the possibility, and sometimes the 
frequency with which the current criminal law can seriously conflict with community views. In 
some cases the law under-criminalizes and under-punishes, as in a panel we just heard 
discussing the failure to prevent the victimization of women.  
In other cases the law over-criminalizes and over-punishes. This can be a serious problem for 
the common law’s reputation even in cases where the offenses are minor, as with criminalizing 
failing to where a hijab or failing to fast or sex before marriage. Apparently some significant 
portion of the population does not see such conduct as criminally condemnable; the criminal 
law’s prohibition is not based upon a strong consensus among the community. This means, 
then, that every instance of prosecution, or even the daily scene of seeing others compelled to 
abide by these prohibitions, has the effect of undermining the criminal law’s moral credibility 
with the community.  
Citizens will say to themselves, if the criminal law can be wrong about these sorts of issues – 
ignoring violence against women, insisting on criminalizing conduct that is not seen as truly 
condemnable – then they are less likely to defer to the criminal law in the future and to see it 
as a moral authority that should have an influence in shaping and internalizing their own norms.  
 I was particularly struck by the fact that Iran’s upper-level governing structure has the 
two parts: the Guardian Council and the Expediency Council. The existence of the Expediency 
Council offers an obvious mechanism for the government to take into account the social 
dynamic that I describe. That is, it may make sense to have a rule that is traditional – perhaps it 
represented community norms at some time in history – but continuing to follow the rule ought 
to be reevaluated if it conflicts with existing community norms. Indeed, one might worry that 
with the loss of moral credibility, the continuing law-community conflicts could undermine 
community support for reliance upon Shari’a generally. Thus, one might conclude that this is an 
instance in which the government ought to take into account the damaging effects and perhaps 
conclude that it is expedient to have criminal law better track community views. 
Now, I don't imagine that the current Expediency Council is going to go look at the social 
psychological data and then revise the criminal law tomorrow, but it is an interesting idea to 
think about because the structure of the government – the existence of the Expediency Council 
– does formally recognize the possibility that although something may be consistent with 
historic Shari’a, it might nonetheless be better for society – and for the future of Shari’a – to 
step back and at least evaluate whether there could be some expediency in softening a rule.  
 The second point that I want to raise in these closing remarks relates to the first but is a 
new and different point that has not been touched upon during the conference. I want to 
describe some social psychological research that has been done over the last several decades, 
primarily by Professor Tom Tyler at New York University.  
 One of the things that Tyler has shown is that even if people are in litigation or are being 
prosecuted, they are much more likely to accept the results of the adjudication, even if goes 
against them, if they perceive the adjudication as having been fair. Even if they are going to be 
punished for their criminal conduct, they are more likely to support and acquiesce in the 
operation of the criminal justice system in the future.  
You can see the parallels here to the empirical research I just discussed concerning community 
perceptions of the criminal law’s substantive criminal liability and punishment rules. If the law 
produces results that track the community shared judgments of justice, it builds moral 
credibility with the community and thereby increases people’s willingness to defer to it. 
Tom Tyler’s research on perceived procedural fairness shows an analogous dynamic. If the 
community sees the adjudication process as being fair it builds the “legitimacy” of the system, 
7 
 
as Tyler calls it, which in turn makes people more inclined to defer to the system and to 
acquiesce in what it does. 
 Now, the power of the system’s “moral credibility” in producing just results is much 
stronger than the power of the system’s “legitimacy” in using a fair procedure. But still, 
procedural fairness is quite important.  
Does this research have some relevance to the adjudication of criminal cases in Iran? I think it 
does. I think the major difficulty would be the fact that individual judges hold the ability to 
determine not just the facts of the case but also to determine the law that is being imposed and 
that they can draw upon not just the criminal statutes but also can draw upon Shari’a principles 
as they interpret them.  
 I think it's easy to see why reliance upon Shari’a is attractive, especially for a country 
that is devoutly Muslim. But the point is that here too there are hidden costs to relying upon 
Shari’a principles in this particular way – by allowing individual judges to decide for themselves 
how to interpret and apply those principles to a particular case.  
First, one hidden cost is that under this sort of system there is unpredictability in the rules that 
will be applied. No one can be sure ahead of time what law will be applied in a particular case 
or how it will be applied.  
 Second, this is a system that will regularly produce inconsistency among judges. Once 
you give judges this kind of discretion, different judges will exercise it differently, and that will 
produce inconsistency in application. That inconsistency will hurt the perceived fairness of the 
adjudication system. The results in any given case will depend the defendant’s good or bad luck 
of the judge assigned to the case rather than what the defendant has actually done or his or her 
blameworthiness for doing it.  
 Third, this kind of system of unbridled judicial discretion presents a transparency 
problem because ordinary citizens can't see where the result is coming from – the source of the 
particular legal rule applied in the case is a black box to them. To the individual judge, it may be 
quite clear. He looks to the Shari’a authorities and, in his mind, the law that he chooses to apply 
may make perfect sense. But because that system is one that cannot be understood from the 
outside, its lack of transparency leaves people wondering: what is it that is really influencing the 
decision in this case? They may imagine all sorts of sources of improper influence that they 
might worry about. They could be completely wrong about that, but without transparency they 
cannot know what is truly driving the adjudication decision. 
 Finally, I think a final problem is one of fair notice. If people don't know beforehand 
exactly what rule is going to be applied, they cannot confidently guide their conduct according 
to what the law demands.  
The end result of all these difficulties is that the community is not likely to have much faith in 
the fairness of the adjudication process. What they see instead is unpredictability, 
inconsistency, a lack of transparency, and a lack of fair notice, and this serves to undermine the 
“legitimacy” of the legal system, which in turn then undermines people’s willingness to defer to 
it.  
 On this issue, I think there is a solution. And some of the countries that I have worked 
with have used the solution. One can avoid the problems of unpredictability, inconsistency, lack 
of transparency, and lack of fair notice simply by reducing the Shari’a principles and rules to a 
codified form that will be clear to all persons beforehand and that will be applied in the same 
way to all defendants in the system.  
8 
 
 This approach not only helps give legitimacy to the current criminal justice adjudication 
system but also helps with a long-term goal of keeping Shari’a principles relevant and influential 
even in the complex and changing circumstances of modernity. 
 I admit that there are many other important factors at issue in making decisions to 
structure a criminal law system. All I am suggesting here is that those people making these 
structural decisions ought to at least know about the practical implications, long-term and 
short-term, of the decisions they make, so they can include those implications in their 
calculations. They will want to take into account not only the obvious costs but also the hidden 
costs of the uncodified discretionary system traditionally used.  
 As a final word, let me thank not only the organizers but all of the speakers at this 
conference over the past two days. I think that I, probably more than any other person in this 
room, have learned an enormous amount and I am indebted to you all for that education. 
Thank you. 
 
  
